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THE TEST OF REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY: As Applied to Inter-
vening Negligence Rather Than the Particular Act Constituting the
Negligence
The district court of appeal in Arthur v. Santa Monica Dairy Co.' has
departed from earlier California decisions which have applied the test of
reasonable foreseeability. Affirming the decision of the trial court which
denied recovery to the plaintiff for injuries from a rear end collision, the
upper court reached this result through a clearly erroneous application of
the test of reasonable foreseeability.
The accident occurred after the defendant had double parked his milk
truck in the right hand lane of a four lane highway next to a line of parked
cars. Such double parking, in violation of section 586 of the Vehicle Code2
has been held to constitute negligence;3 and such negligence on the part of
the defendant was conceded by this court. While negligently double parked
the truck was struck from behind by the car in which the plaintiff was
riding as a passenger. Evidence showed that the driver of the car had been
looking on the floor of the car for a lighted cigarette ten seconds before the
collision and at no time had seen the parked truck in front of him. Thus,
there was no doubt but that this driver was also negligent.
The court held that the intervening negligence of the driver of the
colliding car relieved the defendant from liability on the basis that the act
of the driver, that of taking his eyes from the road ahead and looking for
a cigarette, was not such an act as could have been reasonably foreseen by
the defendant. The court cited as controlling, McMillan v. Thompson,' a
decision which has itself been criticized 5 because it fails to recognize that
the risk of a rear end collision is part of the foreseeable risk created by the
defendant's negligent double parking.
The basic unsoundness of the Arthur decision lies in the clearly erroneous
application of the foreseeability test. Admitting that the defendant could
not have foreseen the particular act of looking for a lighted cigarette, it
does not follow that the act of negligent driving was not foreseeable. The
court should not have looked to the particular act causing the negligent
driving but to the negligent driving itself; for to look only to the act which
gives rise to the negligence and not to the negligence itself is to discard negli-
gence as a reasonably foreseeable happening. Countless different acts, such
as watching the scenery, adjusting the radio, ad infinitum might lead to neg-
ligent driving and if the test of reasonable foreseeability were applied to one
of these particular acts, then it is easy to say, as the court did in Arthur,
that such acts are not reasonably foreseen. Properly applied, the test should
be limited to whether or not the act of negligent driving itself could have
been reasonably foreseen, and not how this driving came about as was done
by the court in Arthur. Thus if the court in Arthur had recognized this
distinction and limited the test to the proper act, it likely would have found
1 183 Cal. App. 2d 483, 6 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1960).
2 Now CAL. VEt. CODE 1959, § 22500(h).
3 Thompson v. Bayless, 24 Cal. 2d 543, 150 P.2d 413 (1944).
4 140 Cal. App. 437, 35 P.2d 419 (1935).
5 Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369, 407 & n.182
(1950).
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that negligent driving was among the hazards reasonably foreseen and with-
in the risk created by the negligent double parking of the defendant.
While few California decisions have found it necessary to point out this
distinction, the district court of appeals in Bilyeu v. Standard Freight Lines8
stated, "It is not the particular act which caused the plaintiff's injury that
is the subject of the foreseeability test to determine the existence of the duty
to exercise care, but the activity of which that act may be a part."7 In
Ferroggiario v. Bowline," essentially the same thought was expressed by the
court which said, "But, if the original actor's conduct is a substantial factor
in bringing about harm to another, the fact that he neither foresaw nor
should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it
occurred does not prevent him from being liable."9
This position is strengthened by the fact that many, if not most, of the
cases which have considered the test of reasonable foreseeability and its
bearing upon relieving the defendant from liability for the risk created by
him, have not even mentioned the act which constituted intervening negli-
gence, but only whether or not the intervening negligence itself was fore-
seeable.
Aside from the McMillan case, which as noted earlier has been appro-
priately criticized as incorrect, there are no other California decisions lend-
ing support to the position taken by the court inArthur. On the other hand,
there is considerable California authority to support the plaintiff's argu-
ment that a person leaving an obstruction on the highway must answer for
his negligence to those injured as a result thereof, notwithstanding the
intervening negligence of another.
For instance, in Mason v. Crawford,0 the defendant, while double
parked, was struck from the rear by the car in which the plaintiff was a
passenger. The court, in holding that the plaintiff was among those to be
protected from the foreseeable risk which existed as part of the original
risk created by the defendant, did not inquire into the cause of the negli-
gence of the driver of the colliding car. Further illustrating this point is
Keiper v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.," in which the defendant negligently
parked his auto on a streetcar track. The streetcar operator failed to see
the defendant's car (although it was daytime and the visibility was good),
and upon colliding therewith shoved the car forward, injuring the plaintiff
who had been working in the street in front of the parked car. The defend-
ant was held liable for his negligence, notwithstanding the negligence of
the streetcar operator, since it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff
might suffer injury as a result of the risk created by the defendant. Again
only the foreseeability of the streetcar operator's negligence, and not the
specific act constituting it, was considered. In fact, the opinion does not
even reveal what had caused the streetcar operator to so act.
Upon considering Mason, Keiper and other similar decisions, as well as
the inherent weaknesses of the court's relying on a case so doubtful as
6 182 Cal. App. 2d 536, 6 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1960).
7Id. at 542, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
8 153 Cal. App. 2d 759, 315 P.2d 446 (1957), 64 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1960).
Old. at 763, 315 P.2d at 448, 64 A.L.R.2d at 1361.
10 17 Cal. App. 2d 529, 62 P.2d 420 (1936).
2136 Cal. App. 362, 172 Pac. 180 (1918).
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McMillan, it would seem that the Arthur decision is unsound; and being
predicated upon a misapplication of the test of reasonable foreseeability,
very unlikely to set a precedent for any future decisions.
Dennis Keeley*
8 Member, Second Year class.
